Added boundary checks when parsing CoAP packets.
Thanks to Stephan Zeisberg for reporting this issue.
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@ -529,8 +529,21 @@ coap_parse_message(void *packet, uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len)
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++current_option;
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}
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if(current_option + option_length > data + data_len) {
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/* Malformed CoAP - out of bounds */
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PRINTF("BAD REQUEST: options outside data packet: %u > %u\n",
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(unsigned)(current_option + option_length - data), data_len);
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return BAD_REQUEST_4_00;
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}
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option_number += option_delta;
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if(option_number > COAP_OPTION_SIZE1) {
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/* Malformed CoAP - out of bounds */
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PRINTF("BAD REQUEST: option number too large: %u\n", option_number);
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return BAD_REQUEST_4_00;
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}
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PRINTF("OPTION %u (delta %u, len %zu): ", option_number, option_delta,
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option_length);
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