Merge branch 'bzr/golem' of /Users/distler/Sites/code/instiki

This commit is contained in:
Jacques Distler 2009-11-30 16:35:46 -06:00
commit f23d892bf9
142 changed files with 519 additions and 843 deletions

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# == Introduction
#
# This module provides sanitization of XHTML+MathML+SVG
# and of inline style attributes. Its genesis is {described here}[http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/~distler/blog/archives/001181.html].
#
# Uses the {HTML5lib parser}[http://code.google.com/p/html5lib/], so that the parsing behaviour should
# resemble that of browsers.
#
# sanitize_xhtml() is a case-sensitive sanitizer, suitable for XHTML
# sanitize_html() is a case-insensitive sanitizer suitable for HTML
# sanitize_rexml() sanitizes a REXML tree, returning a string
# safe_sanitize_xhtml() makes extra-sure that the result is well-formed XHTML
# by running the output of sanitize_xhtml() through REXML
#
# == Files
#
# {sanitize.rb}[http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/~distler/code/instiki/svn/lib/sanitize.rb],
# {HTML5lib}[http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/~distler/code/instiki/svn/vendor/plugins/HTML5lib/]
#
# == Author
#
# {Jacques Distler}[http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/~distler/]
#
# == License
#
# Ruby License
module Sanitize
# This module provides sanitization of XHTML+MathML+SVG
# and of inline style attributes.
require 'html5/html5parser'
require 'html5/liberalxmlparser'
require 'html5/treewalkers'
require 'html5/treebuilders'
require 'html5/serializer'
require 'html5/sanitizer'
require 'stringsupport.rb'
include HTML5
# Sanitize a string, parsed using XHTML parsing rules.
#
# Based heavily on Sam Ruby's code in the Universal FeedParser.
require 'html/tokenizer'
require 'node'
acceptable_elements = ['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'b',
'big', 'blockquote', 'br', 'button', 'caption', 'center', 'cite',
'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'dd', 'del', 'dfn', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt',
'em', 'fieldset', 'font', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6',
'hr', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'map',
'menu', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'p', 'pre', 'q', 's', 'samp',
'select', 'small', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'sub', 'sup', 'table',
'tbody', 'td', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'tr', 'tt', 'u',
'ul', 'var']
mathml_elements = ['maction', 'math', 'merror', 'mfrac', 'mi',
'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom',
'mprescripts', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub',
'msubsup', 'msup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder',
'munderover', 'none']
svg_elements = ['a', 'animate', 'animateColor', 'animateMotion',
'animateTransform', 'circle', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'font-face',
'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'g', 'glyph', 'hkern', 'image',
'linearGradient', 'line', 'marker', 'metadata', 'missing-glyph',
'mpath', 'path', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialGradient', 'rect',
'set', 'stop', 'svg', 'switch', 'text', 'title', 'tspan', 'use']
acceptable_attributes = ['abbr', 'accept', 'accept-charset', 'accesskey',
'action', 'align', 'alt', 'axis', 'border', 'cellpadding',
'cellspacing', 'char', 'charoff', 'charset', 'checked', 'cite', 'class',
'clear', 'cols', 'colspan', 'color', 'compact', 'coords', 'datetime',
'dir', 'disabled', 'enctype', 'for', 'frame', 'headers', 'height',
'href', 'hreflang', 'hspace', 'id', 'ismap', 'label', 'lang',
'longdesc', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'multiple', 'name',
'nohref', 'noshade', 'nowrap', 'prompt', 'readonly', 'rel', 'rev',
'rows', 'rowspan', 'rules', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size',
'span', 'src', 'start', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'target', 'title',
'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'vspace', 'width', 'xml:lang']
mathml_attributes = ['actiontype', 'align', 'columnalign', 'columnalign',
'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'depth',
'display', 'displaystyle', 'equalcolumns', 'equalrows', 'fence',
'fontstyle', 'fontweight', 'frame', 'height', 'linethickness', 'lspace',
'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathvariant', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize',
'minsize', 'other', 'rowalign', 'rowalign', 'rowalign', 'rowlines',
'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'scriptlevel', 'selection',
'separator', 'stretchy', 'width', 'width', 'xlink:href', 'xlink:show',
'xlink:type', 'xmlns', 'xmlns:xlink']
svg_attributes = ['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alphabetic',
'arabic-form', 'ascent', 'attributeName', 'attributeType',
'baseProfile', 'bbox', 'begin', 'by', 'calcMode', 'cap-height',
'class', 'color', 'color-rendering', 'content', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx',
'dy', 'descent', 'display', 'dur', 'end', 'fill', 'fill-rule',
'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant',
'font-weight', 'from', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name',
'gradientUnits', 'hanging', 'height', 'horiz-adv-x', 'horiz-origin-x',
'id', 'ideographic', 'k', 'keyPoints', 'keySplines', 'keyTimes',
'lang', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerHeight',
'markerUnits', 'markerWidth', 'mathematical', 'max', 'min', 'name',
'offset', 'opacity', 'orient', 'origin', 'overline-position',
'overline-thickness', 'panose-1', 'path', 'pathLength', 'points',
'preserveAspectRatio', 'r', 'refX', 'refY', 'repeatCount', 'repeatDur',
'requiredExtensions', 'requiredFeatures', 'restart', 'rotate', 'rx',
'ry', 'slope', 'stemh', 'stemv', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity',
'strikethrough-position', 'strikethrough-thickness', 'stroke',
'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap',
'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity',
'stroke-width', 'systemLanguage', 'target',
'text-anchor', 'to', 'transform', 'type', 'u1', 'u2',
'underline-position', 'underline-thickness', 'unicode',
'unicode-range', 'units-per-em', 'values', 'version', 'viewBox',
'visibility', 'width', 'widths', 'x', 'x-height', 'x1', 'x2',
'xlink:actuate', 'xlink:arcrole', 'xlink:href', 'xlink:role',
'xlink:show', 'xlink:title', 'xlink:type', 'xml:base', 'xml:lang',
'xml:space', 'xmlns', 'xmlns:xlink', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'zoomAndPan']
attr_val_is_uri = ['href', 'src', 'cite', 'action', 'longdesc', 'xlink:href']
acceptable_css_properties = ['azimuth', 'background-color',
'border-bottom-color', 'border-collapse', 'border-color',
'border-left-color', 'border-right-color', 'border-top-color', 'clear',
'color', 'cursor', 'direction', 'display', 'elevation', 'float', 'font',
'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight',
'height', 'letter-spacing', 'line-height', 'overflow', 'pause',
'pause-after', 'pause-before', 'pitch', 'pitch-range', 'richness',
'speak', 'speak-header', 'speak-numeral', 'speak-punctuation',
'speech-rate', 'stress', 'text-align', 'text-decoration', 'text-indent',
'unicode-bidi', 'vertical-align', 'voice-family', 'volume',
'white-space', 'width']
acceptable_css_keywords = ['auto', 'aqua', 'black', 'block', 'blue',
'bold', 'both', 'bottom', 'brown', 'center', 'collapse', 'dashed',
'dotted', 'fuchsia', 'gray', 'green', '!important', 'italic', 'left',
'lime', 'maroon', 'medium', 'none', 'navy', 'normal', 'nowrap', 'olive',
'pointer', 'purple', 'red', 'right', 'solid', 'silver', 'teal', 'top',
'transparent', 'underline', 'white', 'yellow']
acceptable_svg_properties = [ 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule',
'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin',
'stroke-opacity']
acceptable_protocols = [ 'ed2k', 'ftp', 'http', 'https', 'irc',
'mailto', 'news', 'gopher', 'nntp', 'telnet', 'webcal',
'xmpp', 'callto', 'feed', 'urn', 'aim', 'rsync', 'tag',
'ssh', 'sftp', 'rtsp', 'afs' ]
ALLOWED_ELEMENTS = acceptable_elements + mathml_elements + svg_elements unless defined?(ALLOWED_ELEMENTS)
ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES = acceptable_attributes + mathml_attributes + svg_attributes unless defined?(ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES)
ALLOWED_CSS_PROPERTIES = acceptable_css_properties unless defined?(ALLOWED_CSS_PROPERTIES)
ALLOWED_CSS_KEYWORDS = acceptable_css_keywords unless defined?(ALLOWED_CSS_KEYWORDS)
ALLOWED_SVG_PROPERTIES = acceptable_svg_properties unless defined?(ALLOWED_SVG_PROPERTIES)
ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = acceptable_protocols unless defined?(ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS)
ATTR_VAL_IS_URI = attr_val_is_uri unless defined?(ATTR_VAL_IS_URI)
# Sanitize the +html+, escaping all elements not in ALLOWED_ELEMENTS, and stripping out all
# attributes not in ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES. Style attributes are parsed, and a restricted set,
# specified by ALLOWED_CSS_PROPERTIES and ALLOWED_CSS_KEYWORDS, are allowed through.
# attributes in ATTR_VAL_IS_URI are scanned, and only URI schemes specified in
# ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS are allowed.
# You can adjust what gets sanitized, by defining these constant arrays before this Module is loaded.
#
# sanitize_html('<script> do_nasty_stuff() </script>')
# => &lt;script> do_nasty_stuff() &lt;/script>
# sanitize_html('<a href="javascript: sucker();">Click here for $100</a>')
# => <a>Click here for $100</a>
def sanitize_html(html)
if html.index("<")
tokenizer = HTML::Tokenizer.new(html)
new_text = ""
while token = tokenizer.next
node = XHTML::Node.parse(nil, 0, 0, token, false)
new_text << case node.tag?
when true
if ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.include?(node.name)
if node.closing != :close
node.attributes.delete_if { |attr,v| !ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.include?(attr) }
ATTR_VAL_IS_URI.each do |attr|
val_unescaped = CGI.unescapeHTML(node.attributes[attr].to_s).gsub(/[\000-\040\177\s]+|\302*[\200-\240]/,'').downcase
if val_unescaped =~ /^[a-z0-9][-+.a-z0-9]*:/ and !ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.include?(val_unescaped.split(':')[0])
node.attributes.delete attr
end
end
if node.attributes['style']
node.attributes['style'] = sanitize_css(node.attributes['style'])
end
end
node.to_s
# :call-seq:
# sanitize_xhtml(string) -> string
# sanitize_xhtml(string, {:encoding => 'iso-8859-1', :to_tree => true}) -> REXML::Document
#
# Unless otherwise specified, the string is assumed to be utf-8 encoded.
# By default, the output is a string. But, optionally, you can return a REXML tree.
#
# The string returned is utf-8 encoded. If you want, you can use iconv to convert it to some other encoding.
# (REXML trees are always utf-8 encoded.)
def sanitize_xhtml(html, options = {})
@encoding = 'utf-8'
@treebuilder = TreeBuilders::REXML::TreeBuilder
@to_tree = false
options.each do |name, value|
next unless %w(encoding treebuilder to_tree).include? name.to_s
if name.to_s == 'treebuilder'
@treebuilder = HTML5lib::TreeBuilders.get_tree_builder(value)
else
node.to_s.gsub(/</, "&lt;")
instance_variable_set("@#{name}", value)
end
end
if @encoding == 'utf-8'
parsed = XHTMLParser.parse_fragment(html.to_utf8, {:tokenizer => HTMLSanitizer,
:lowercase_element_name => false, :lowercase_attr_name => false,
:encoding => @encoding, :tree => @treebuilder })
else
node.to_s.gsub(/</, "&lt;")
parsed = XHTMLParser.parse_fragment(html.to_ncr, {:tokenizer => HTMLSanitizer,
:lowercase_element_name => false, :lowercase_attr_name => false,
:encoding => @encoding, :tree => @treebuilder })
end
return parsed if @to_tree
return parsed.to_s
end
html = new_text
end
html
# Sanitize a string, parsed using XHTML parsing rules. Reparse the result to
# ensure well-formedness.
#
# :call-seq:
# safe_sanitize_xhtml(string) -> string
#
# Unless otherwise specified, the string is assumed to be utf-8 encoded.
#
# The string returned is utf-8 encoded. If you want, you can use iconv to convert it to some other encoding.
# (REXML trees are always utf-8 encoded.)
def safe_sanitize_xhtml(html, options = {})
options[:to_tree] = false
sanitized = sanitize_xhtml(html, options)
doc = REXML::Document.new("<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>#{sanitized}</div>")
sanitized = doc.to_s.gsub(/\A<div xmlns='http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xhtml'>(.*)<\/div>\Z/m, '\1')
rescue REXML::ParseException
sanitized = sanitized.escapeHTML
end
def sanitize_css(style)
# disallow urls
style = style.to_s.gsub(/url\s*\(\s*[^\s)]+?\s*\)\s*/, ' ')
# gauntlet
if style !~ /^([:,;#%.\sa-zA-Z0-9!]|\w-\w|\'[\s\w]+\'|\"[\s\w]+\"|\([\d,\s]+\))*$/
style = ''
return style
# Sanitize a string, parsed using HTML parsing rules.
#
# :call-seq:
# sanitize_html( string ) -> string
# sanitize_html( string, {:encoding => 'iso-8859-1', :to_tree => true} ) -> REXML::Document
#
# Unless otherwise specified, the string is assumed to be utf-8 encoded.
# By default, the output is a string. But, optionally, you can return a REXML tree.
#
# The string returned is utf-8 encoded. If you want, you can use iconv to convert it to some other encoding.
# (REXML trees are always utf-8 encoded.)
def sanitize_html(html, options = {})
@encoding = 'utf-8'
@treebuilder = TreeBuilders::REXML::TreeBuilder
@to_tree = false
options.each do |name, value|
next unless %w(encoding treebuilder to_tree).include? name.to_s
if name.to_s == 'treebuilder'
@treebuilder = HTML5lib::TreeBuilders.get_tree_builder(value)
else
instance_variable_set("@#{name}", value)
end
if style !~ /^(\s*[-\w]+\s*:\s*[^:;]*(;|$))*$/
style = ''
return style
end
if @encoding == 'utf-8'
parsed = HTMLParser.parse_fragment(html.to_utf8, {:tokenizer => HTMLSanitizer,
:encoding => @encoding, :tree => @treebuilder })
else
parsed = HTMLParser.parse_fragment(html.to_ncr, {:tokenizer => HTMLSanitizer,
:encoding => @encoding, :tree => @treebuilder })
end
return parsed if @to_tree
return parsed.to_s
end
clean = []
style.scan(/([-\w]+)\s*:\s*([^:;]*)/) do |prop,val|
if ALLOWED_CSS_PROPERTIES.include?(prop.downcase)
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
elsif ['background','border','margin','padding'].include?(prop.split('-')[0].downcase)
goodval = true
val.split().each do |keyword|
if !ALLOWED_CSS_KEYWORDS.include?(keyword) and
keyword !~ /^(#[0-9a-f]+|rgb\(\d+%?,\d*%?,?\d*%?\)?|\d{0,2}\.?\d{0,2}(cm|em|ex|in|mm|pc|pt|px|%|,|\))?)$/
goodval = false
end
end
if goodval
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
end
elsif ALLOWED_SVG_PROPERTIES.include?(prop.downcase)
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
end
end
style = clean.join(' ')
# Sanitize a REXML tree. The output is a string.
#
# :call-seq:
# sanitize_rexml(tree) -> string
#
def sanitize_rexml(tree)
tokens = TreeWalkers.get_tree_walker('rexml2').new(tree)
XHTMLSerializer.serialize(tokens, {:encoding=>'utf-8',
:space_before_trailing_solidus => true,
:inject_meta_charset => false,
:sanitize => true})
end
end
require 'rexml/element'
module REXML #:nodoc:
class Element
# Convert XHTML+MathML Named Entities in a REXML::Element to Numeric Character References
#
# :call-seq:
# tree.to_ncr -> REXML::Element
#
# REXML, typically, converts NCRs to utf-8 characters, which is what you'll see when you
# access the resulting REXML document.
#
# Note that this method needs to traverse the entire tree, converting text nodes and attributes
# for each element. This can be SLOW. It will often be faster to serialize to a string and then
# use String.to_ncr instead.
#
def to_ncr
self.each_element { |el|
el.texts.each_index {|i|
el.texts[i].value = el.texts[i].to_s.to_ncr
}
el.attributes.each { |name,val|
el.attributes[name] = val.to_ncr
}
el.to_ncr if el.has_elements?
}
return self
end
# Convert XHTML+MathML Named Entities in a REXML::Element to UTF-8
#
# :call-seq:
# tree.to_utf8 -> REXML::Element
#
# Note that this method needs to traverse the entire tree, converting text nodes and attributes
# for each element. This can be SLOW. It will often be faster to serialize to a string and then
# use String.to_utf8 instead.
#
def to_utf8
self.each_element { |el|
el.texts.each_index {|i|
el.texts[i].value = el.texts[i].to_s.to_utf8
}
el.attributes.each { |name,val|
el.attributes[name] = val.to_utf8
}
el.to_utf8 if el.has_elements?
}
return self
end
end
end
module HTML5 #:nodoc: all
module TreeWalkers
private
class << self
def [](name)
case name.to_s.downcase
when 'rexml'
require 'html5/treewalkers/rexml'
REXML::TreeWalker
when 'rexml2'
REXML2::TreeWalker
else
raise "Unknown TreeWalker #{name}"
end
end
alias :get_tree_walker :[]
end
module REXML2
class TreeWalker < HTML5::TreeWalkers::NonRecursiveTreeWalker
private
def node_details(node)
case node
when ::REXML::Document
[:DOCUMENT]
when ::REXML::Element
if !node.name
[:DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT]
else
[:ELEMENT, node.name,
node.attributes.map {|name,value| [name,value.to_utf8]},
node.has_elements? || node.has_text?]
end
when ::REXML::Text
[:TEXT, node.value.to_utf8]
when ::REXML::Comment
[:COMMENT, node.string]
when ::REXML::DocType
[:DOCTYPE, node.name, node.public, node.system]
when ::REXML::XMLDecl
[nil]
else
[:UNKNOWN, node.class.inspect]
end
end
def first_child(node)
node.children.first
end
def next_sibling(node)
node.next_sibling
end
def parent(node)
node.parent
end
end
end
end
end

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#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require File.expand_path(File.join(File.dirname(__FILE__), '/../test_helper'))
require File.expand_path(File.dirname(__FILE__) + '/../test_helper')
require 'sanitize'
require 'json'
class SanitizeTest < Test::Unit::TestCase
include Sanitize
def setup
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.each do |tag_name|
def do_sanitize_xhtml stream
safe_sanitize_xhtml(stream)
end
def check_sanitization(input, htmloutput, xhtmloutput, rexmloutput)
assert_equal htmloutput, do_sanitize_xhtml(input)
end
def rexml_doc(string)
REXML::Document.new(
"<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>#{string}</div>")
end
def my_rex(string)
sanitize_rexml(rexml_doc(string.to_utf8)).gsub(/\A<div xmlns="http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xhtml">(.*)<\/div>\Z/m, '\1')
end
def test_sanitize_named_entities
input = '<p>Greek &phis; &phi;, double-struck &Aopf;, numeric &#x1D538; &#8279;, uppercase &TRADE; &LT;</p>'
output = "<p>Greek \317\225 \317\206, double-struck \360\235\224\270, numeric \360\235\224\270 \342\201\227, uppercase \342\204\242 &lt;</p>"
output2 = "<p>Greek \317\225 \317\206, double-struck \360\235\224\270, numeric &#x1D538; &#8279;, uppercase \342\204\242 &lt;</p>"
assert_equal(output, sanitize_xhtml(input))
assert_equal(output, sanitize_html(input))
assert_equal(output, my_rex(input))
assert_equal(output2, input.to_utf8)
end
def test_sanitize_malformed_utf8
input = "<p>\357elephant &AMP; \302ivory</p>"
output = "<p>\357\277\275elephant &amp; \357\277\275ivory</p>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.each do |tag_name|
define_method "test_should_allow_#{tag_name}_tag" do
assert_equal "<#{tag_name} title=\"1\">foo &lt;bad>bar&lt;/bad> baz</#{tag_name}>",
sanitize_html("<#{tag_name} title='1'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</#{tag_name}>")
input = "<#{tag_name} title='1'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</#{tag_name}>"
htmloutput = "<#{tag_name.downcase} title='1'>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</#{tag_name.downcase}>"
xhtmloutput = "<#{tag_name} title='1'>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</#{tag_name}>"
rexmloutput = xhtmloutput
if %w[caption colgroup optgroup option tbody td tfoot th thead tr].include?(tag_name)
htmloutput = "foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz"
xhtmloutput = htmloutput
elsif tag_name == 'col'
htmloutput = "foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz"
xhtmloutput = htmloutput
rexmloutput = "<col title='1' />"
elsif tag_name == 'table'
htmloutput = "foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt;baz<table title='1'> </table>"
xhtmloutput = htmloutput
elsif tag_name == 'image'
htmloutput = "<img title='1'/>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz"
xhtmloutput = htmloutput
rexmloutput = "<image title='1'>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</image>"
elsif VOID_ELEMENTS.include?(tag_name)
htmloutput = "<#{tag_name} title='1'/>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz"
xhtmloutput = htmloutput
htmloutput += '<br/>' if tag_name == 'br'
rexmloutput = "<#{tag_name} title='1' />"
end
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, rexmloutput)
end
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.each do |tag_name|
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.each do |tag_name|
define_method "test_should_forbid_#{tag_name.upcase}_tag" do
assert_equal "&lt;#{tag_name.upcase} title=\"1\">foo &lt;bad>bar&lt;/bad> baz&lt;/#{tag_name.upcase}>",
sanitize_html("<#{tag_name.upcase} title='1'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</#{tag_name.upcase}>")
input = "<#{tag_name.upcase} title='1'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</#{tag_name.upcase}>"
output = "&lt;#{tag_name.upcase} title=\"1\"&gt;foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz&lt;/#{tag_name.upcase}&gt;"
xhtmloutput = "&lt;#{tag_name.upcase} title='1'&gt;foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz&lt;/#{tag_name.upcase}&gt;"
check_sanitization(input, output, xhtmloutput, output)
end
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.each do |attribute_name|
if attribute_name != 'style'
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.each do |attribute_name|
next if attribute_name == 'style' || attribute_name.include?(':')
define_method "test_should_allow_#{attribute_name}_attribute" do
assert_equal "<p #{attribute_name}=\"foo\">foo &lt;bad>bar&lt;/bad> baz</p>",
sanitize_html("<p #{attribute_name}='foo'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</p>")
end
input = "<p #{attribute_name}='foo'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</p>"
output = "<p #{attribute_name}='foo'>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</p>"
htmloutput = "<p #{attribute_name.downcase}='foo'>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</p>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.each do |attribute_name|
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.each do |attribute_name|
define_method "test_should_forbid_#{attribute_name.upcase}_attribute" do
assert_equal "<p>foo &lt;bad>bar&lt;/bad> baz</p>",
sanitize_html("<p #{attribute_name.upcase}='display: none;'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</p>")
input = "<p #{attribute_name.upcase}='display: none;'>foo <bad>bar</bad> baz</p>"
output = "<p>foo &lt;bad&gt;bar&lt;/bad&gt; baz</p>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.each do |protocol|
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.each do |protocol|
define_method "test_should_allow_#{protocol}_uris" do
assert_equal "<a href=\"#{protocol}\">foo</a>",
sanitize_html(%(<a href="#{protocol}">foo</a>))
input = %(<a href="#{protocol}">foo</a>)
output = "<a href='#{protocol}'>foo</a>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
end
Sanitize::ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.each do |protocol|
Sanitizer::ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.each do |protocol|
define_method "test_should_allow_uppercase_#{protocol}_uris" do
assert_equal "<a href=\"#{protocol.upcase}\">foo</a>",
sanitize_html(%(<a href="#{protocol.upcase}">foo</a>))
input = %(<a href="#{protocol.upcase}">foo</a>)
output = "<a href='#{protocol.upcase}'>foo</a>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
end
def test_should_allow_anchors
assert_equal "<a href=\"foo\">&lt;script>baz&lt;/script></a>",
sanitize_html("<a href='foo' onclick='bar'><script>baz</script></a>")
Sanitizer::SVG_ALLOW_LOCAL_HREF.each do |tag_name|
next unless Sanitizer::ALLOWED_ELEMENTS.include?(tag_name)
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_allow_local_href_with_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="#foo" xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>)
output = "<#{tag_name.downcase} xlink:href='#foo' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
xhtmloutput = "<#{tag_name} xlink:href='#foo' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
# RFC 3986, sec 4.2
def test_allow_colons_in_path_component
assert_equal "<a href=\"./this:that\">foo</a>",
sanitize_html("<a href=\"./this:that\">foo</a>")
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_allow_local_href_with_newline_and_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="\n#foo" xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>)
output = "<#{tag_name.downcase} xlink:href='\n#foo' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
xhtmloutput = "<#{tag_name} xlink:href='\n#foo' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
%w(src width height alt).each do |img_attr|
define_method "test_should_allow_image_#{img_attr}_attribute" do
assert_equal "<img #{img_attr}=\"foo\" />",
sanitize_html("<img #{img_attr}='foo' onclick='bar' />")
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_forbid_local_href_without_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="#foo"/>)
output = "&lt;#{tag_name.downcase} xlink:href='#foo'/>"
xhtmloutput = "&lt;#{tag_name} xlink:href=&#39;#foo&#39;&gt;&lt;/#{tag_name}&gt;"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_forbid_local_href_with_newline_without_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="\n#foo"/>)
output = "&lt;#{tag_name.downcase} xlink:href='\n#foo'/>"
xhtmloutput = "&lt;#{tag_name} xlink:href=&#39;\n#foo&#39;&gt;&lt;/#{tag_name}&gt;"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_forbid_nonlocal_href_with_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="http://bad.com/foo" xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>)
output = "<#{tag_name.downcase} xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
xhtmloutput = "<#{tag_name} xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
define_method "test_#{tag_name}_should_forbid_nonlocal_href_with_newline_and_ns_decl" do
input = %(<#{tag_name} xlink:href="\nhttp://bad.com/foo" xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>)
output = "<#{tag_name.downcase} xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
xhtmloutput = "<#{tag_name} xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink'/>"
check_sanitization(input, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput, xhtmloutput)
end
end
def test_should_handle_non_html
assert_equal 'abc', sanitize_html("abc")
def test_should_handle_astral_plane_characters
input = "<p>&#x1d4b5; &#x1d538;</p>"
output = "<p>\360\235\222\265 \360\235\224\270</p>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
input = "<p><tspan>\360\235\224\270</tspan> a</p>"
output = "<p><tspan>\360\235\224\270</tspan> a</p>"
check_sanitization(input, output, output, output)
end
def test_should_handle_blank_text
assert_equal '', sanitize_html('')
JSON::parse(open(File.expand_path(File.join(File.dirname(__FILE__), '/../sanitizer.dat'))).read).each do |test|
define_method "test_#{test['name']}" do
check_sanitization(
test['input'],
test['output'],
test['xhtml'] || test['output'],
test['rexml'] || test['output']
)
end
[%w(img src), %w(a href)].each do |(tag, attr)|
define_method "test_should_strip_#{attr}_attribute_in_#{tag}_with_bad_protocols" do
assert_equal %(<#{tag} title="1">boo</#{tag}>), sanitize_html(%(<#{tag} #{attr}="javascript:XSS" title="1">boo</#{tag}>))
end
end
[%w(img src), %w(a href)].each do |(tag, attr)|
define_method "test_should_strip_#{attr}_attribute_in_#{tag}_with_bad_protocols_and_whitespace" do
assert_equal %(<#{tag} title="1">boo</#{tag}>), sanitize_html(%(<#{tag} #{attr}=" javascript:XSS" title="1">boo</#{tag}>))
end
end
[%(<img src="javascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src=javascript:alert('XSS') />),
%(<img src="JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')" />),
%(<img src='javascript:alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)' />),
%(<img src='javascript:alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))' />),
%(<img src='&#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58;&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;&#40;&#39;&#88;&#83;&#83;&#39;&#41;' />),
%(<img src='&#0000106;&#0000097;&#0000118;&#0000097;&#0000115;&#0000099;&#0000114;&#0000105;&#0000112;&#0000116;&#0000058;&#0000097;&#0000108;&#0000101;&#0000114;&#0000116;&#0000040;&#0000039;&#0000088;&#0000083;&#0000083;&#0000039;&#0000041' />),
%(<img src='&#x6A;&#x61;&#x76;&#x61;&#x73;&#x63;&#x72;&#x69;&#x70;&#x74;&#x3A;&#x61;&#x6C;&#x65;&#x72;&#x74;&#x28;&#x27;&#x58;&#x53;&#x53;&#x27;&#x29' />),
%(<img src="jav\tascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src=" &#14; javascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src="&#x20;javascript:alert('XSS');" />),
%(<img src="&#xA0;javascript:alert('XSS');" />)].each_with_index do |img_hack, i|
define_method "test_should_not_fall_for_xss_image_hack_#{i}" do
assert_equal "<img />", sanitize_html(img_hack)
end
end
def test_should_sanitize_tag_broken_up_by_null
assert_equal "&lt;scr>alert(\"XSS\")&lt;/scr>", sanitize_html(%(<scr\0ipt>alert(\"XSS\")</scr\0ipt>))
end
def test_should_sanitize_invalid_script_tag
assert_equal "&lt;script />&lt;/script>", sanitize_html(%(<script/XSS SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></script>))
end
def test_should_sanitize_script_tag_with_multiple_open_brackets
assert_equal "&lt;&lt;script>alert(\"XSS\");//&lt;&lt;/script>", sanitize_html(%(<<script>alert("XSS");//<</script>))
assert_equal %(&lt;iframe src="http:" />&lt;), sanitize_html(%(<iframe src=http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html\n<))
end
def test_should_sanitize_unclosed_script
assert_equal "&lt;script src=\"http:\" /><b>", sanitize_html(%(<script src=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js?<b>))
end
def test_should_sanitize_half_open_scripts
assert_equal "<img>", sanitize_html(%(<img src="javascript:alert('XSS')"))
end
def test_should_not_fall_for_ridiculous_hack
img_hack = %(<img\nsrc\n=\n"\nj\na\nv\na\ns\nc\nr\ni\np\nt\n:\na\nl\ne\nr\nt\n(\n'\nX\nS\nS\n'\n)\n"\n />)
assert_equal "<img />", sanitize_html(img_hack)
end
def test_platypus
assert_equal %(<a href=\"http://www.ragingplatypus.com/\" style=\"display: block; width: 100%; height: 100%; background-color: black; background-image: ; background-x: center; background-y: center;\">never trust your upstream platypus</a>),
sanitize_html(%(<a href="http://www.ragingplatypus.com/" style="display:block; position:absolute; left:0; top:0; width:100%; height:100%; z-index:1; background-color:black; background-image:url(http://www.ragingplatypus.com/i/cam-full.jpg); background-x:center; background-y:center; background-repeat:repeat;">never trust your upstream platypus</a>))
end
def test_xul
assert_equal %(<p style="">fubar</p>),
sanitize_html(%(<p style="-moz-binding:url('http://ha.ckers.org/xssmoz.xml#xss')">fubar</p>))
end
def test_input_image
assert_equal %(<input type="image" />),
sanitize_html(%(<input type="image" src="javascript:alert('XSS');" />))
end
def test_non_alpha_non_digit
assert_equal "&lt;script />&lt;/script>",
sanitize_html(%(<script/XSS src="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></script>))
assert_equal "<a>foo</a>",
sanitize_html('<a onclick!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert("XSS")>foo</a>')
assert_equal "<img />",
sanitize_html('<img/src="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"/>')
end
def test_img_dynsrc_lowsrc
assert_equal "<img />",
sanitize_html(%(<img dynsrc="javascript:alert('XSS')" />))
assert_equal "<img />",
sanitize_html(%(<img lowsrc="javascript:alert('XSS')" />))
end
def test_div_background_image_unicode_encoded
assert_equal '<div style="">foo</div>',
sanitize_html(%(<div style="background-image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029">foo</div>))
end
def test_div_expression
assert_equal '<div style="">foo</div>',
sanitize_html(%(<div style="width: expression(alert('XSS'));">foo</div>))
end
def test_img_vbscript
assert_equal '<img />',
sanitize_html(%(<img src='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")' />))
end
end

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