Mpenz asked what would happen if the config looked like
repo foo/abc
R sitaram
repo foo/.*
RW sitaram
If you asked for an expand of '.*', it would pick up permissions from
the second set (i.e., "RW") and print them against "foo/abc".
This is misleading, since those are not the permissions that will
actually be *used*. Gitolite always uses the more specific form if it
is given, which means your actual permissions are just "R".
This patch is to prevent that misleading reporting in this corner case.
- see *all* wildcard repos you have access to (this uses line-anchored
regexes as described in doc/4). Examples:
ssh git@server expand '.*'
ssh git@server expand 'assignment.*'
- show perms like the info command does
Please see comments against 02cee1d for more details and caveats.
The "msysgit doesnt have 'comm'" commit (from 2 days ago), had 2 bugs:
- (smaller) the "+++" which was part of the diff header was triggering
a spurious rc file "new variables" warning, but there were no actual
variables to update
- (bigger) worse, the grep command, when there were no matches,
coupled with the "set -e" to kill the program right there (ouch!)
It's not clear whether $projectroot has or does not have a trailing
slash. Current code assumes it does, but we need to cater for it not
having one also. Otherwise the final reponame ends up with a leading
slash, once $projectroot has been stripped from the beginning of the
full repo path.
The way pubkey files are handled by gitolite, this could be used by a
repo admin to get shell access. It's always been there as an
undocumented emergency mechanism for an admin who lost his shell keys or
overwrote them due to not understanding ssh well enough (and it has been
so used at least once).
But not any more...
Like the @SHELL case, this reflects a shift away from treating people
with repo admin rights as eqvt to people who have shell on the server,
and systematically making the former lesser privileged than the latter.
While in most cases (including my $DAYJOB) these two may be the same
person, I am told that's not a valid assumption for others, and there've
been requests to close this potential loophole.
I know hardly anyone is using delegation, but if you find yourself
locked out from pushing because of this one little thing, do this:
* on your gitolite-admin clone, add the required lines per this patch,
and commit
* on the server, edit ~/.gitolite/conf/gitolite.conf-compiled.pm, and
delete the following line
'NAME_LIMITS' => 1
from the entry for "gitolite-admin" (if you don't know what that
means delete *all* such lines) and save the file
* back on your admin repo clone, do a push
I know hardly anyone is using delegation, but if you find yourself
locked out from pushing because of this one little thing, do this:
* on your gitolite-admin clone, add the required lines per this patch,
and commit
* on the server, edit ~/.gitolite/conf/gitolite.conf-compiled.pm, and
delete the following line
'NAME_LIMITS' => 1
from the entry for "gitolite-admin" (if you don't know what that
means delete *all* such lines) and save the file
* back on your admin repo clone, do a push
Stop conflating the privilege to push changes to the admin repo with the
privilege to get a shell on the server.
Please read doc/6 carefully before upgrading to this version. Also
please ensure that the gitolite key is *not* your only means to get a
command line on the server
Currently, a line like
RW foo = user1
allows user1 to push any ref that contains the string refs/heads/foo.
This includes refs like
refs/heads/foo
refs/heads/foobar
refs/heads/foo/bar
which is fine; that is what is intended. (You can always use foo$
instead of foo if you want to prevent the latter two).
Similarly,
RW refs/foo = user1
allows
refs/foo
refs/foobar
refs/foo/bar
Now, I don't see this as a "security risk" but the fact is that this
allows someone to clutter your repo with junk like
refs/bar/refs/heads/foo
refs/heads/bar/refs/heads/foo
(or, with the second config line example,
refs/bar/refs/foo
refs/heads/bar/refs/foo
)
My personal advice is if you find someone doing that intentionally, you
should probably take him out and shoot him [*], but since now *two*
people have complained about this, here goes...
----
[*] you don't have to take him out if you don't want to
gitolite specific ssh commands ("getperms", "setperms", "info" etc.)
should exit with non-error code in case of success.
Also "get/setperms" should print to STDOUT instead of STDERR.
This change is specially needed for the gitolite-tools
(http://github.com/tmatilai/gitolite-tools) to work.
Signed-off-by: Teemu Matilainen <teemu.matilainen@reaktor.fi>
Support config file including using:
include "filename"
If filename is not an absolute path, it is looked from the
$GL_ADMINDIR/conf/ directory.
For security reasons include is not allowed for fragments.
Signed-off-by: Teemu Matilainen <teemu.matilainen@reaktor.fi>
This is a backward incompatible change. If you are using delegation and
you upgrade to this version, please do the following:
* change your gitolite.conf file to use the new syntax (see
doc/5-delegation.mkd in this commit)
* for each branch "foo" in the gitolite-admin repo, do this:
# (on "master" branch)
git checkout foo -- conf/fragments/foo.conf
* git add all those new fragments and commit to master
* delete all the branches on your clone and the server
# again, for each branch foo
git branch -D foo
git push origin :foo
(this commit will probably get reverted after a suitable period has
elapsed and no one is likely to still be using the old syntax).
Forgetting to change it to NAME/ after is a security issue -- you end up
permitting stuff you don't want to!
This commit allows the old syntax but prints a warning
Gitolite allows you to restrict changes by file/dir name. The syntax
for this used "PATH/" as a prefix to denote such file/dir patterns.
This has now been changed to "NAME/" because PATH is potentially
confusing.
While this is technically a backward-incompatible change, the feature
itself was hitherto undocumented, and only a few people were using it,
so I guess it's not that bad...
Also added documentation now.
This reverts commit 6576e82e33.
On oddball configs, where the shell key is reused as the gitolite key by
smart( people|-alecks), the ls-remote stops the program dead, preventing
the "git add" and "git commit" that seed the admin repo.
This makes extra work in terms of fixing it after the fact; removing it
makes the install go further, and all you need to do is (1) delete the
first line from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the server and (2) back on the
client do a "git clone gitolite:gitolite-admin".
OK so it needs to be removed. Explaining that was the easy part! The
hard part is explaining why removing it is harmless.
Look at the commit tree around that commit, and see that the commit
before that (b78a720) was partially reverted in e7e6085. b78a720
removed the new_repo call from compile, forcing it to happen only on
auth, which forced this workaround for seeding the admin repo.
Since e7e6085 reverted that part of b78a720, giving back new_repo
functions to compile, this line of code wasn't doing any good. QED and
all that :)
for those not yet able to upgrade (or until I merge this into the branch
you care about), if you have a repo called, say "bk2git", just refer to
it as "bk2git.git" in the clone command!
[Thanks to Mark Frazer for finding this...]
"repo @all" can be used to set permissions or configurations for all
already defined repos. (A repository is defined if it has permission
rules associated, empty "repo" stanza or "@group=..." line is not enough.)
For example to allow a backup user to clone all repos:
# All other configuration
[...]
repo @all
R = backup
Signed-off-by: Teemu Matilainen <teemu.matilainen@reaktor.fi>
we've removed the facility of auto-viving "W" access repos when they are
not wildcards. A wildcard pattern like foo/CREATER was
indistinguishable from a non-wildcard repo, and resolving it was
becoming kludgier and kludgier. (See the revert in the commit before
this one for details).
As a side effect of not being able to distinguish wildcard repos from
real repos easily, the expand command now works for a normal repo too
(because we have to make it work for "foo/CREATER")
This reverts commit 33fc0a7e9f.
Was causing too much trouble with access reporting (basic and expanded)
because of the extra ^ at the start...
The paranoia referred to in that commit was this sequence:
- admin creates a named (non wildcard) repo using config file push
- somehow that gets deleted (OS error, corruption, ...)
- admin just asks anyone with a current repo to push it to auto-revive
it (because we allow people with "W" access to non-wildcard repos to
auto-viv repos)
- if you're treating this the same as a wildcard creation, you end up
making this guy the "creater" of that repo, which means he can add
users etc...
We resolve that paranois by disallowing autoviv of "W" access repos at
all... Only "C" access repos can be autovived by a user (this will be
in the next commit)
".../gl-auth-command username" is the normal command that authkeys
forces, and this prevents that key from being used to get a shell.
We now allow the user to get a shell if the forced command has a "-s"
before the "username", like ".../gl-auth-command -s sitaram".
(Now that a plain "ssh gitolite" gets you a shell, there's a new "info"
command that such privileged keys can use to get basic access info).
Thanks to Jesse Keating for the idea! I can't believe this never
occurred to me before, but I guess I was so enamoured of my "innovation"
in converting what used to be an error into some useful info I didn't
think a bit more :/
Looks like I'd forgotten this when I did the autoviv code. Repos
created via gl-compile (when you add a new repo to the config file and
push) worked fine, but repos created via gl-auth (when you autoviv a
repo, wild or not) did not.
This *should* be merged into wildrepos soon after testing; wildrepos
will have a lot more autoviv-ing than master.
The admin repo's post-update hook needs to know where $GL_ADMINDIR is,
and we had a weird way of doing that which depended on gl-install
actually munging the hook code.
We also always assumed the binaries are in GL_ADMINDIR/src.
We now use an env var to pass both these values. This removes the weird
dependency on gl-install that the post-update hook had, as well as make
running other programs easier due to the new $GL_BINDIR env var.
...like "git clone host:foo/", even if it matches "repo foo/.*"
NOTE: I expect a few more of these special cases to be found as time
goes on and people find new ways to abuse the regex system, whether it
is done intentionally or not. Anything not fixable by changing the
config file will be fixed in the code asap.
This one, for instance, seems fixable by using "foo/.+" instead of
"foo/.*". But it actually isn't; the user can do "git clone host:foo//"
and bypass that :(
Still I suspect most situations will get an entry in the "then don't do
that" file :)
----
patient: "doc, it hurts when I do this"
doc: "then don't do that"
