(security) fix bug in pattern to detect path traversal

while we're about it, add the same check to some of the internal
routines, so that commands can also be protected.

finally, just to make sure we don't lose it again in some other fashion,
add a few tests for path traversal...

src/gitolite-shell

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ sub sanity {
     my $repo = shift;
     _die "'$repo' contains bad characters" if $repo !~ $REPONAME_PATT;
     _die "'$repo' ends with a '/'"         if $repo =~ m(/$);
-    _die "'$repo' contains '..'"           if $repo =~ m(\.\.$);
+    _die "'$repo' contains '..'"           if $repo =~ m(\.\.);
 }
 
 # ----------------------------------------------------------------------

src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm

@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ my $last_repo = '';
 
 sub access {
     my ( $repo, $user, $aa, $ref ) = @_;
-    _die "invalid repo '$repo'" if not( $repo and $repo =~ $REPOPATT_PATT );
     _die "invalid user '$user'" if not( $user and $user =~ $USERNAME_PATT );
+    sanity($repo);
+
     my $deny_rules = option( $repo, 'deny-rules' );
     load($repo);
 
@@ -175,8 +176,18 @@ sub option {
     return $ret->{$option};
 }
 
+sub sanity {
+    my $repo = shift;
+
+    _die "invalid repo '$repo'" if not( $repo and $repo =~ $REPOPATT_PATT );
+    _die "'$repo' ends with a '/'" if $repo =~ m(/$);
+    _die "'$repo' contains '..'" if $repo =~ $REPONAME_PATT and $repo =~ m(\.\.);
+}
+
 sub repo_missing {
     my $repo = shift;
+    sanity($repo);
+
     return not -d "$rc{GL_REPO_BASE}/$repo.git";
 }
 
@@ -400,6 +411,8 @@ sub generic_name {
 
 sub creator {
     my $repo = shift;
+    sanity($repo);
+
     return ( $ENV{GL_USER} || '' ) if repo_missing($repo);
     my $f       = "$rc{GL_REPO_BASE}/$repo.git/gl-creator";
     my $creator = '';

t/0-me-first.t

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ use warnings;
 use lib "src/lib";
 use Gitolite::Test;
 
+my $rb = `gitolite query-rc -n GL_REPO_BASE`;
+
 # initial smoke tests
 # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-try "plan 65";
+try "plan 73";
 
 # basic push admin repo
 confreset;confadd '
@@ -75,4 +77,19 @@ try "
     glt ls-remote u5 file:///cc/1;  ok;     perl s/TRACE.*//g; !/\\S/
     glt ls-remote u5 file:///cc/2;  !ok;    /DENIED by fallthru/
     glt ls-remote u6 file:///cc/2;  !ok;    /DENIED by fallthru/
+
+    # command
+    glt perms u4 -c cc/bar/baz/frob + READERS u2;
+                                    ok;     /Initialized empty .*cc/bar/baz/frob.git/
+
+    # path traversal
+    glt ls-remote u4 file:///cc/dd/../ee
+                                    !ok;    /FATAL: 'cc/dd/\\.\\./ee' contains '\\.\\.'/
+    glt ls-remote u5 file:///cc/../../../../../..$rb/gitolite-admin
+                                    !ok;    /FATAL: 'cc/../../../../../..$rb/gitolite-admin' contains '\\.\\.'/
+
+    glt perms u4 -c cc/bar/baz/../frob + READERS u2
+                                    !ok;    /FATAL: 'cc/bar/baz/\\.\\./frob' contains '\\.\\.'/
+
+
 ";